On the design and optimisation of Tardos probabilistic fingerprinting codes by Furon, Teddy et al.
On the design and optimisation of Tardos probabilistic
fingerprinting codes
Teddy Furon, Arnaud Guyader, Fre´de´ric Ce´rou
To cite this version:
Teddy Furon, Arnaud Guyader, Fre´de´ric Ce´rou. On the design and optimisation of Tardos
probabilistic fingerprinting codes. Proc. of the 10th Information Hiding Workshop, 2008,
Santa Barbara, United States. 2008. <inria-00504549>
HAL Id: inria-00504549
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00504549
Submitted on 26 Jul 2010
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
On the design and optimization of Tardos
probabilistic fingerprinting codes
Teddy Furon, Arnaud Guyader, and Fre´de´ric Ce´rou
Centre de Recherche INRIA Rennes Bretagne Atlantique⋆
Abstract. G. Tardos [1] was the first to give a construction of a finger-
printing code whose length meets the lowest known bound inO(c2 log n
ǫ1
).
This was a real breakthrough because the construction is very simple.
Its efficiency comes from its probabilistic nature. However, although G.
Tardos almost gave no argument of his rationale, many parameters of his
code are precisely fine-tuned. This paper proposes this missing rationale
supporting the code construction. The key idea is to render the statistics
of the scores as independent as possible from the collusion process. Tar-
dos optimal parameters are rediscovered. This interpretation allows small
improvements when some assumptions hold on the collusion process.
1 In Gabor Tardos’ shoes
This article deals with active fingerprinting, also known as traitor tracing, or
forensics, when applied on multimedia content. Fingerprinting is the application
where a content server distributes personal copies of the same content to n
different buyers. Some are dishonest users, called colluders, who mix their copies
to yield a pirated content.
A binary fingerprinting code is a set of n different m bit sequences {Xj}nj=1.
Each sequence identifying a user has to be hidden in his/her personal copy with
a watermarking technique. When a pirated copy is found, the server retrieves
a m bit sequence Y and accuses some users or nobody. There are two kinds of
errors: accusing an innocent (i.e. a false positive whose probability is denoted
pfp) and accusing none of the colluders (i.e. a false negative with probability
pfn). The designers of the fingerprinting code must assess the minimum length
of the code so that the probabilities of error are below some significance levels:
pfa < ǫ1 and pfn < ǫ2. One of the best fingerprinting codes is a probabilistic
code proposed by G. Tardos, where m = O(c2 log nǫ1 ), where c is the number of
colluders. Before Tardos’ work, the existence of such a short code was proven.
Tardos is the first to exhibit a construction which is surprisingly simple.
This breakthrough has appealed a numerous amount of research works. The
goal of Tardos was to show a construction of an efficient fingerprinting code,
where the length of the code was approximated. This yields a thread of works
about refining the lower bound of the code length [2–4]. Improvements, such as
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symmetric codes and q-ary codes have been proposed in [2]. Indeed, we study in
this paper Skoric’s symmetric version of the binary Tardos code. In the sequel,
we abusively shorten this expression in ‘Tardos code’ in reference to the inventor
of this family of codes. Implementation issues have also been addressed in [4,5].
1.1 A pedagogical approach
The nature of our article is very different. We are not providing better estima-
tions of the code length. Our primary goal is to understand the key idea behind
this code. Reading Tardos’ seminal paper is very frustrating because Tardos pro-
poses his construction hardly giving any clue on his rationale. His paper shows
the code, gives a rough expression of its length, and chiefly proves that the prob-
abilities of error match the constraints. Our aim is to rediscover how Tardos
came up to invent this code. We have found different interpretations or expla-
nations than those given in the previous works on Tardos codes, and we believe
they help understanding how probabilistic codes work. Thanks to this better
understanding, some small improvements are given at the end of the paper.
Another product of our analysis is that we create different classes of collusion.
Usually, cryptographic papers dealing with traitor tracing use classes of collusion
based on the nature of the symbols the collusion can forge: these are commonly
denoted narrow or wide sense classes [6]. Nevertheless, these two classes are
equivalent for binary codes studied in this article. Another variation is whether
or not the collusion can produce erasures in detectable [7] or even undetectable
positions [8]. We do not consider erasures here. We base the introduced four new
classes of collusion not on the nature of the potentially forged symbols, but on
side information the collusion has access to (see section 2 for details).
1.2 Probabilistic codes
We keep the same structure of code than G. Tardos’ one, what he defined as
probabilistic codes. We denote random variables by capital letters and their oc-
curences by their normal version. The sequenceXj = (Xj1, · · · , Xjm) identifying
user j is composed of m independent binary symbols, with P (Xji = 1) = pi,
∀i ∈ [m], with [m] denoting {1, . . . ,m}. {Pi}mi=1 are independent and identi-
cally distributed random variables in the range [0, 1]: Pi ∼ f(p). They have been
drawn, taking the values {pi}mi=1, before the code construction.Y = (Y1, · · · , Ym)
is the sequence decoded from the pirated copy. The accusation process accuses
user j if Sj > T , where Sj =
∑m
i=1 U(Yi, Xji, pi), and T is a threshold. Roughly
speaking, U(Yi, Xji, pi) is positive when Xji = Yi, tending to accuse user j,
U(Yi, Xji, pi) is negative when Xji 6= Yi, tending to plead user j as innocent.
The random variables {Pi}mi=1 are independent and identically distributed
with a pdf f which is assumed to be symmetric around 1/2: f(p) = f(1− p). It
means that symbols ‘1’ and ‘0’ play a similar role with probability p or 1 − p.
This implies that the summands U(Yi, Xji, pi) in the accusation sum Sj follow
the rules:
U(1, 1, p) = g1(p), U(0, 0, p) = g1(1− p), (1)
U(1, 0, p) = g0(p), U(0, 1, p) = g0(1− p). (2)
Functions g0 and g1 are notations from G. Tardos’ paper, and common to Skoric’s
works [2,3]. The function g1 is used when symbols Xji and Yi match, function g0
when they are different. These weights depend on the probability to find symbol
Yi at this index, i.e. pi if Yi = 1, 1− pi if Yi = 0.
Designing a binary probabilistic code means to find the optimal functions f ,
g1 and g0. But, the definition of optimality is not very clear. Skoric et al. took
Chernoff’s lower bound of the code length as the criterion, and they partially
rediscovered Tardos functions [3]. We invoke a different rationale.
The main drawback of probabilistic codes is that, a priori, the score of the
innocents is a random variable whose statistics depend on the collusion process,
which is unknown at the decoding side. This also obviously holds for the scores of
the colluders. On the other hand, Tardos announces two very astonishing facts:
1. The probabilities of error are guaranteed whatever the collusion process is.
The threshold and the length are also fixed and independent of the collusion
process (for a given collusion size c).
2. There is no need to calculate the scores of all the users. A user is deemed
guilty if his accusation sum is greater than the threshold.
Although Tardos did not say anything on the key ideas supporting his code
construction, we believe that his intuition was to render the scores as independent
as possible from the collusion process. In other words, the first task is to render
the statistics of the scores independent, before optimizing the code length.
The fingerprinting code being probabilistic, it is not surprising that our study
is solely based on the statistics of the score of an innocent (section 3) and of the
score of a colluder (section 4). The score being a sum of independent random
variables, we consider it as Gaussian distributed. This assumption really helps
interpretating what G. Tardos had in mind. Item number one in the list above
implies that we need expectations and variances of the scores (innocents and
colluders) to be independent of the collusion process. Item number two implies
that the scores are also mutually independent. Tardos’ choices of functions f , g1
and g0 do fulfill these two conditions. This paper studies the converse: we look
for functions f , g1 and g0 achieving independence.
However, this use of the central limit theorem is absolutely not recommended
when estimating the code length because it amounts to integrate the distribution
function on its tail where the Gaussianity assumption does not hold. In other
words, when the expectations and variances are set independent of the collusion
process, the behaviour of the code is fixed up to the second order. Nevertheless,
a precise evaluation of the threshold value and the code length would need
further developments. The Berry-Esse´en bound shows that the gap between the
Gaussian law and the real distribution of the scores depends on their third
moment, which a priori depends on the collusion process1.
2 The marking assumption and the four classes of
collusion
Fingerprinting code has been first studied by the cryptographic community.
The marking assumption was a concept invented by Boneh and Shaw [7]. It
states that, in its narrow-sense version, whatever the strategy of the collusion
{j1, · · · , jc}, we have Yi ∈ {Xj1i, · · · , Xjci}. In words, colluders forge the pirated
copy by assembling chunks from their personal copies. It implies that if, at chunk
i, the colluders symbols are identical, then this symbol value is decoded at the
i-th chunk of the pirated copy.
This is what watermarkers have understood from the pioneering crypto-
graphic work. However, this has led to misconceptions. Another important thing
is the way cryptographers have modelized a host content: it is a binary string
where some symbols can be changed without spoiling the regular use of the con-
tent. These locations are used to insert the sequence symbols. This implies that
colluders disclose symbols from their identifying sequences comparing their per-
sonal copies symbol by symbol. Is this the case with multimedia fingerprinting?
In a multimedia application, the content is divided into chunks ci. A chunk
can be a few second clip of audio or video. Symbol Xji is hidden in the i-th
chunk of the content with a watermarking technique. This gives the i-th chunk
sent to the j-th user: cji. In this paper, we only address the collusion process
where the pirated copy is forged by picking chunks from the colluders personal
copies. We do not address mixing of several chunks into one.
2.1 The blind colluders
We consider a first class of colluders. Before receiving the personal copies, these c
dishonest users, denoted by their indices {j1, · · · , jc}, have already agreed on how
to forge the pirated copy. This strategy amounts to set an assignation sequence
(M1, · · · ,Mm) with Mi ∈ {j1, · · · , jc}, such that Yi = XMi,i. We assume that
the colluders share the risk, so that the cardinal |{i|Mi = ju}| ≈ m/c, for
all u ∈ [c]. The assignation sequence is random and independent of the personal
copies. We introduce the random variable Σi as the number of symbols ‘1’ which
the collusion gets at index i, the conditional probability concerning Yi is given
by: PYi(0|Σi = σi) = (c− σi)/c. The important thing is that the blind colluders
set their assignation sequence without observing their personal copies.
2.2 The sighted colluders
This second class of colluders differs in the fact that the assignation sequence is
now a function of the personal copies. These colluders are able to split their copies
1 Skoric et al. also stress the crucial role of the cutoff parameter in the convergence
speed of the Berry-Esse´en bound [2, Sec. 7.1].
in chunks and to compare them sample by sample. Hence, for any index i, they
are able to notice that, for instance, chunks cj1i and cj2i are different or identical.
For binary embedded symbols, they can constitute two stacks, each containing
identical chunks. This allows new collusion processes such as a majority vote
(the pirated chunk is taken for the stack whose size is bigger) or a minority
vote... From a statistical point of view, the majority vote yields the following
conditional probability: PYi(0|Σi = σi) = 1 if σi < c/2, 0 else. For the minority
vote: PYi(0|Σi = σi) = 1 if σi > c/2, 0 else, with the noticeable exceptions due
to the marking assumption: PYi(0|Σi = 0) = 1 and PYi(0|Σi = c) = 0.
The important thing is that colluders can notice differences between chunks,
but they cannot tell which chunk contains symbol ‘0’. Hence, symbols ‘1’ and
‘0’ play a symmetric role, which strongly links the conditional probabilities:
PYi(0|Σi = σi) = PYi(1|Σi = c− σi) = 1− PYi(0|Σi = c− σi). (3)
2.3 The cryptographic colluders
In the third class, the colluders know parts of their code sequences. This is
the case in the model used by cryptographers since Boneh and Shaw [7]. The
bits are directly pasted in the host content string, and thus observable by the
colluders. However, the marking assumption is still valid. New strategies are
then possible like the ‘All 0’ (resp. ‘All 1’) consisting in putting a symbol ‘0’
(resp. ‘1’) in the pirated copy chunks whenever this is possible. This is the case
when all the colluders do not have c embedded ‘1’ (resp. ‘0’) in their chunks:
PYi(0|Σi = σi) = 1 if σi < c, 0 else (resp. PYi(0|Σi = σi) = 0 if σi > 0). Note
that the relationship (3) does not hold anymore.
2.4 The omniscient colluders
In this last class, the colluders know the value of pi for all index i. They can
adapt their strategy for each index chunk according to its value pi. From a
statistical point of view, we just write that the conditional probabilities depend
on σi and pi: PYi(0|Σi = σi, Pi = pi). Subsection 4.2 reveals the optimum values
of the worst case collusion. This class of collusion breaks the code, in the sense
that the omniscient colluders will not be accused almost surely. Therefore, it is
mandatory that the value of pi for all index i remains secret, so that, this class
of colluders never exists. This threat considerably reduces the interest in making
Pi discrete random variables as proposed in [4]. This option shortens the size of
memory needed to store the value of pi, but it introduces a security flaw as the
set of possible values is public.
2.5 An open issue about multimedia fingerprint
Cryptographic fingerprinting codes and probabilistic codes target the third type
of collusion. We do think that such powerful colluders are not realistic in multi-
media fingerprinting. Colluders do not have the watermark decoder to disclose
their embedded sequence. An open question is then: Provided the colluders are
less powerful than foreseen, is there a hope to invent more suitable (i.e. shorter
sequences) fingerprinting code?
3 User j is an innocent
In our quest of finding the optimal functions g1, g0 and f , we apply the idea of
setting the statistics of Sj (knowing that user j is innocent) independent from
the collusion process. We assume that symbols {Yi}mi=1 are mutually independent
and distributed such that P (Yi = 1) = qi (denoted Qi, when considered as a
random variable). This distribution a priori depends on several parameters: the
size of the collusion, the class of the collusion, the collusion process used at index
i and the value of pi.
3.1 Expectation of Sj
E(Sj) =
∑m
i=1 E(U(Yi, Xji, Pi)) = mE(U(Yi, Xji, Pi)), where E denotes mathe-
matical expectation. Dropping the subscripts and using (1) and (2):
E(U(Y,X, P )) = EPEY EXU(Y,X, P )
=
∫ 1
0
q(pg1(p) + (1− p)g0(p))f(p)dp
+
∫ 1
0
(1− q)(pg0(1− p) + (1− p)g1(1− p))f(p)dp. (4)
Now, the problem is that the detection side ignores many parameters of the
distribution, so that q is unknown. We believe that Tardos had in mind to remove
this dependence on q. The most general manner to achieve this, is the following:
E(U(Y,X, P )) = E(H(P )) + E(QA(P )),
with
H(p) = pg0(1− p) + (1− p)g1(1− p), (5)
A(p) = H(1− p)−H(p). (6)
The expectation of the summand of the innocent’s score is independent of the
collusion process if and only if A(p) = 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that H is
symmetric: H(p) = H(1− p), ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. In this case:
E(U(Y,X, P )) =
∫ 1
0
H(p)f(p)dp.
Hence, we know in advance the expectation of the innocent’s score, regardless
of the collusion process. If it is not zero, we can always subtract this constant to
the scores. Hence, without loss of generality, let us impose that EH(P ) = 0.
3.2 Variance of Sj
The variance of a random variable a is denoted by Var(a). The summands of the
score are independent and their expectation is null. Hence: Var(Sj) = E(S
2
j ) =∑m
i=1 E(U(Yi, Xji, Pi)
2).
E(U(Y,X, P )2) = EpEY EXU(Y,X, P )
2
=
∫ 1
0
q(pg1(p)
2 + (1− p)g0(p)2)f(p)dp
+
∫ 1
0
(1− q)(pg0(1− p)2 + (1− p)g1(1− p)2)f(p)dp. (7)
The most general manner to achieve independence is as follows:
E(U(Y,X, P )2) = E(G(P )) + E(QB(P )),
with
G(p) = pg0(1− p)2 + (1− p)g1(1− p)2, (8)
B(p) = G(1− p)−G(p). (9)
The variance of the summand of the innoncent’s score is independent of the
collusion process if and only if B(p) = 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. This implies that G is
symmetric: G(p) = G(1− p), ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. In this case:
E(U(Y,X, P )2) =
∫ 1
0
G(p)f(p)dp.
Hence, we know in advance the variance of the innocent’s score, regardless of
the collusion process. If it is not one, we can always normalize the scores. Hence,
without loss of generality, let us impose that EG(P ) = 1 so that Var(Sj) = m.
3.3 Cross-correlation
Thanks to the CLT, when m is big enough, the score Sj for an innocent is
approximately distributed as a Gaussian distribution N (0,m). We investigate
here the dependence with the score Sk knowing that user k is also an innocent.
This amounts to calculate their correlation since Sk and Sj are deemed Gaussian.
Cov(Sj , Sk) = E(SjSk) =
m∑
i=1
E(U(Yi, Xji, Pi)U(Yi, Xki, Pi)), with
E(U(Y,Xj , P )U(Y,Xk, P )) = E(Q(Pg1(P ) + (1− P )g0(P ))2)
+ E((1−Q)(Pg0(1− P ) + (1− P )g1(1− P ))2)
= E(H2(P ) +Q(H2(1− P )−H2(P ))). (10)
A cross correlation independent of the collusion process is achieved for H2(p) =
H2(1− p). This condition was already fulfilled, cf. subsection 3.1. Thus we have
E(U(Y,Xj , P )U(Y,Xk, P )) = E(H
2(P )), and scores Sj and Sk are independent
if and only if H(p) = 0, ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. Injecting this new result in the expression of
G(p) gives:
G(p) = p.
(1− p)2
p2
g21(1− p) + (1− p)g21(1− p) =
1− p
p
g21(1− p). (11)
Remembering the constraint on the variance of the innocent score, we have:∫ 1
0
g21(1− p)
1− p
p
f(p)dp =
∫ 1
0
g21(p)
p
1− pf(p)dp = 1. (12)
We have also collected two other equations, ∀p ∈ [0, 1]:
H(p) = 0 → pg0(1− p) = −(1− p)g1(1− p) (13)
G(p) = G(1− p) → (1− p)g1(1− p) = pg1(p) (14)
In this last equation, we assume that g1 as a constant sign over [0, 1]. We do
not have enough equations to fully determine the three functions g1, g0, and f .
However, any occurence of g0(p), g0(1 − p), and g1(1 − p) can be replaced by
expressions involving only g1(p).
4 User j is a colluder
We seek more relations to find out the three functions. For the moment, we do
not restrict our study to a particular collusion process.
4.1 Variance of Sj
The collusion process implies a distribution of the couple {Yi, Xji}, with user j
being a colluder. Dropping the subscript but keeping in mind the dependence on
p, this distribution equals PY X(y, x|p) = PY (y|x, p)PX(x|p). Colluders do not
receive sequences different in nature than the ones of the innocents: PX(x|p) =
px(1− p)1−x. Finally, we can write:
PY X(0, 0|p) = PY (0|0, p)(1− p) PY X(1, 1|p) = PY (1|1, p)p
PY X(1, 0|p) = (1− PY (0|0, p))(1− p) PY X(0, 1|p) = (1− PY (1|1, p))p
Hence, the collusion process is only defined, from a statistical point of view,
via two functions depending on p: PY (0|0, p) and PY (1|1, p). As done for the
variance of the score of an innocent, we write:
E(U(Y,X, P )2) = E(PY X(0, 0|P )g21(1− P ) + PY X(1, 1|P )g21(P ))
+ E(PY X(0, 1|P )g20(1− P ) + PY X(1, 0|P )g20(P )).
Knowing relations (13) and (14), we express the four summands with g1(p):
PY X(0, 0|p)g21(1− p) = PY (0|0, p)(1− p)g21(1− p) = PY (0|0, p)
p2
(1− p)g
2
1(p),
PY X(1, 1|p)g21(p) = PY (1|1, p)pg21(p),
PY X(0, 1|p)g20(1− p) = PY (0|1, p)pg21(p) = (1− PY (1|1, p))pg21(p),
PY X(1, 0|p)g20(p) = (1− PY (0|0, p))(1− p)g20(p)
= (1− PY (0|0, p)) p
2
1− pg
2
1(p).
It appears that, whatever the collusion process, the expectation of the square of
the summands in the colluders’ score is constant:
E(U(Y,X, P )2) = E
(
g1(P )
2 P
1− P
)
= 1
Thus, given the results of Sect. 3, the variance of the score is already independent
of the collusion process, equaling Var(Sj |j ∈ C) = m(1−E(U(Y,X, P ))2). Hence,
the impact of the collusion process is solely determined by E(U(Y,X, P )): The
lower this expectation is, the more difficult it will be to find back the colluders.
4.2 Expectation of Sj
The expectation of the score of one colluder is surprisingly much more involved.
However, as G. Tardos did, it is simpler to calculate the expectation of the sum of
the c scores of the colluders. If the colluders share the risk evenly, we can suppose
that the expectation of one colluder’s score is the average of this expectation:
E(Sj |j ∈ C) = c−1E(
∑c
k=1 U(Y,Xjk , P )). If this is not the case, we are sure that
at least one colluder has an expected score bigger than this average. Hence, at
the decoding side, it will be easier to distinguish the two hypothesis (j is an
innocent, j is a colluder) when this expectation is bigger. We have:
E
(
c∑
k=1
U(Y,Xjk , P )
)
= E
(
c∑
σ=0
PY Σ(0, σ|P )((c− σ)g1(1− P ) + σg0(1− P ))
+
c∑
σ=0
PY Σ(1, σ|P )((c− σ)g0(P ) + σg1(P ))
)
. (15)
As usual, we express the summands with function g1(P ).
E
(
c∑
k=1
U(Y,Xjk , P )
)
= E
g1(P )
1− P
c∑
σ=0
(PY (0|σ, P )− PY (1|σ, P ))PΣ(σ)(cP − σ),
(16)
with PΣ(σ) = (
c
σ)P
σ(1− P )c−σ.
The omniscient colluders This last equation shows what the worst collusion
process is. The goal of the colluders is to minimize this expectation, which hap-
pens if PY (0|σ, p) = 1 and PY (1|σ, p) = 0 when cp < σ, PY (0|σ, p) = 0 and
PY (1|σ, p) = 1 else. This optimum strategy is only possible when the collusion
knows exactly the values σi (number of symbols ‘1’ it got) and {pi}mi=1. This
corresponds to the omniscient colluders class. The next subsection deals with
the other classes of colluders.
4.3 Independence from the collusion strategy
The other classes of colluders have in common their ignorance of the values
{pi}mi=1. This translates in the fact that P can be forgotten in the conditional
probabilities. Hence, we can exchange the expectation and sum in (16):
E
(
c∑
k=1
U(Y,Xjk , P )
)
=
c∑
σ=0
(PY (0|σ)− PY (1|σ))(cσ)Ic(σ) (17)
with
Ic(σ) = E
(
g1(P )P
σ(1− P )c−σ−1(cP − σ)) ,
=
∫ 1
0
g1(p)f(p)
(1− p) p
σ(1− p)c−σ(cp− σ)dp (18)
This family of integrals has the following property:
Lemma 1. c and σ being integers such that 0 ≤ σ ≤ c, we have:
Ic(σ) = −Ic(c− σ),
Therefore,
∑c
σ=0(
c
σ)Ic(σ) = 0 and Ic(c/2) = 0 when c is even.
The proof of this lemma is based on the change of variable p′ = 1 − p in the
integral, knowing that this change lets g1(p)f(p)(1−p)−1 invariant according to
(14) and the assumption that f is symmetric around 1/2.
Inserting PY (1|σ) = 1− PY (0|σ) in (17), simplifies in:
E
(
c∑
k=1
U(Y,Xjk , P )
)
= 2
c∑
σ=0
PY (0|σ)(cσ)Ic(σ). (19)
The decoding side a priori ignores the values {PY (0|σ)}cσ=0, except for two cases:
The marking assumption states that PY (0|σ = 0) = 1, and PY (0|σ = c) = 0.
Hence, the only way to get rid of the remaining unknown conditional probabilities
is to find function g1(p)f(p) such that Ic(σ) = 0, ∀σ, 0 < σ < c. (14) tells us that
the block g1(p)f(p)/(1−p) is symmetric. For this reason, we define a symmetric
function T (p) = pg1(p)f(p) which could cancel the (c−1) integrals: ∀σ, 0 < σ < c
Ic(σ) =
∫ 1
0
T (p)Pc,σ(p)dp with Pc,σ(p) = p
σ−1(1− p)c−σ−1(cp− σ).
Lemma 2. The family of polynomials {Pc,σ}c−1σ=1 spans the subspace P of poly-
nomials of degree equal or less than (c− 1) whose integral over [0, 1] is null.
The proof is in Annex A.1. A corollary of this proposition is that such a function
T exists: T (p) = cst, ∀p ∈ [0, 1]. The next subsection shows that Tardos actually
made this choice while the last section of the paper considers other solutions.
4.4 Rediscovering Tardos’ solution
Suppose we have found a function S, such that its projection onto P is null (ie.
Ic(σ) = 0, ∀0 < σ < c), it is symmetric and positive (ie. S(p) = S(1 − p) ≥ 0).
This means that S is a good candidate as a prototype for pg1(p)f(p). Note that
αS with α > 0 also fulfills these requirements. What is the maximum α? Let us
write pf(p)g1(p) = αS(p). (12) and the fact that f is a pdf defines these two
constraints for α:
α−1 =
∫ 1
0
S(p)g1(p)(1− p)−1dp =
∫ 1
0
S(p)(pg1(p))
−1dp
Thanks to the properties of S, the expectation of the sum of the colluders’
score is now independent of their strategy and equal to:
E
(
c∑
k=1
U(Y,Xjk , P )
)
= 2cα
∫ 1
0
S(p)pc−1dp, (20)
= 2
∫ 1
0
S(p)dp√∫ 1
0
S(p)g1(p)
1−p dp.
∫ 1
0
S(p)
pg1(p)
dp
(21)
The simplification of the numerator happens thanks to lemma 2. The polynomial
pc−1−c−1 has a degree equal to c−1 and a null integral. Hence, it belongs to the
linear subspace P. S being orthogonal to this subspace (with a scalar product
defined as the integral over [0, 1]), we have
∫ 1
0
S(p)pc−1dp = c−1
∫ 1
0
S(p)dp.
At last, once we have rendered the statistics of the scores of the innocents
and of the colluders independent from the collusion process, comes the criterion
of optimality. We will define it as the choice of functions f and g1 maximizing
the expectation of the sum of the colluders. A Cauchy-Schwarz inequality on the
product of the denominator shows the maximum:
E
(
c∑
k=1
U(Y,Xjk , p)
)
≤ 2
∫ 1
0
S(p)dp∫ 1
0
S(p)(p(1− p))−1/2dp
(22)
with equality if g1(p) ∝
√
(1− p)/p, and thus f(p) ∝ S(p)/√p(1− p). Note
that this maximization holds for any choice of function S. For the simplest
choice (S(p) = 1), we finally rediscover Tardos’ functions:
f(p) =
1
π
√
p(1− p) , g1(p) =
√
1− p
p
.
This choice yields E(
∑c
k=1 U(Y,Xjk , p)) = 2/π.
5 How to make a better choice?
We investigate whether there is still room for improvements compared to Tardos
choice.
5.1 Fixed size of collusion
If the application scenario can assess that the colluders will always be no more
than c, then the dimension of the space P is finite and equal to (c− 1). In order
to use powerful mathematical objects such as Legendre polynomials, a change
of variable p = (1 + x)/2 is advised. This transforms the rhs of (22) into:∫ 1
−1
t(x)dx∫ 1
−1
t(x)(1− x2)−1/2dx
, with t(x) = S((1 + x)/2). (23)
We are looking for the function t defined over [−1, 1] which maximizes this ratio,
while having the following properties:
– t(x) = t(−x) because S(p) must be symmetric wrt 1/2,
– its projection onto P is null because Ic(σ) = 0, ∀0 < σ < c.
– t(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ [−1, 1],
Thanks to the change of variable, a basis of the linear space P is defined as
polynomials of degree less or equal to (c−1) whose integral over [−1, 1] are null,
and orthonormal for the following scalar product: < f, g >=
∫ 1
−1
f(x)g(x)dx.
This exactly corresponds to the normalized Legendre polynomials2: {PLl }c−1l=1 .
Odd order Legendre polynomials are anti-symmetric. Even order ones reach their
maximum values at x = ±1, and PL2k(1) = 1.
If t is smooth enough3, it can be expressed as a series of Legendre polynomial:
t(x) =
∑∞
k=0 τkP
L
k (x), ∀x ∈ [−1, 1]. The above listed properties imply that:
τ2k+1 = 0 ∀k, τk = 0 for 0 < k < c, and τ0 +
∑
k≥⌈(c−1)/2⌉ τ2k ≥ 0.
Lemma 3. βl =
∫ 1
−1
PL2l(x)(1− x2)−1/2dx = π2−4l(2ll )2.
Moreover: 0 < βl+1 < βl, ∀l ∈ N.
Therefore:
∫ 1
−1
t(x)dx∫ 1
−1
t(x)(1− x2)−1/2dx
=
2
π

1 + τ−10
∞∑
k>(c−1)/2
τ2k2
−4k(2kk )
2


−1
, (24)
which is maximized under the constraint τ0 +
∑
k>(c−1)/2 τ2k ≥ 0, by setting
τ2k = 0, except τ2⌈(c−1)/2⌉ = −τ0. Table 1 gives the numerical values for the
2 without the change of variable, we would have resorted to the shifted Legendre
polynomials which are less known.
3 This assumption prevents us from looking for discrete random variable {pi}, i.e.
when f is a sum of Dirac distributions as in [4].
first sizes of collusion. Note that these expectations converges to Tardos’ one as
c increases. In fact, when we cannot make any assumption on the maximum size
of the collusions, Tardos’ alternative T (p) = pf(p)g1(p) = 1 is the only choice.
Another important fact is that the function S has an impact on f , but not
on g1 (see (22) and the line after). Hence, the assumptions yielding function S
must be known when generating the code, but not necessary on the decoding
side.
c 2 4 6 8 10
mE(
Pc
k=1
U(Y,Xjk , p)) 85 74 71 69 68
Increase in % 33.3 16.4 10.8 8.1 6.5
Table 1. Best expectations of the sum of the scores of the colluders for a code length
m = 100, when the size of the collusion is known. Corresponding increase in percentage
compared to Tardos solution for which mE(
Pc
k=1
U(Y,Xjk , P )) = 2m/pi = 63.7.
5.2 Unique collusion process
Suppose that we know what the collusion process is, i.e. we know all the prob-
abilities PY (1|σ, p) and PY (0|σ, p) for any value of p ∈ [0, 1] and σ ∈ [c]. We
can simplify (16) in E(
∑c
k=1 U(Y,Xjk , P )) = E(g1(P )(1−P )−1C(P )), where C,
defined accordingly, solely depends on the collusion process. We can always de-
compose C(p) as the sum of a symmetric function Cs(p) and an anti-symmetric
function Ca(p). As we have constrained g1(p)(1 − p)−1 to be symmetric, then
E(
∑c
k=1 U(Y,Xjk , P )) = E(g1(P )(1− P )−1Cs(P )). A Cauchy-Schwarz inequal-
ity gives an upper bound of this expectation, which holds for any function g1:
E
(
g1(P )
1− P Cs(P )
)
≤
√
E
(
P
1− P g
2
1(P )
)√
E
(
C2s (P )
(1− P )P
)
=
√
E
(
C2s (P )
(1− P )P
)
.
The first square root equals one thanks to (14). Equality holds when g1(p) =
λCs(p)p
−1. The value of λ is given by the constraint on the variance of the score
of the innocent: λ = 1/
√
E(C2s (P )/P (1− P )), and the expectation is then equal
to E(
∑c
k=1 U(Y,Xjk , P )) = λ
−1. In comparison, Tardos’ choice yields a lower
expectation:
E
(
c∑
k=1
U(Y,Xjk , P )
)
= E
(√
C2s (P )
P (1− P )
)
≤
√
E
(
C2s (P )
P (1− P )
)
. (25)
Thanks to the concavity of the function x 7→ √x, Jensen inequality ensures
that our choice is better than Tardos’ one with respect to the expectation of
the sum of the scores of the colluders. Yet, this holds when the decoding side
exactly knows what function C is (collusion process and size of the collusion).
It is a kind of matched detection process, such as the matched filters receptors
in digital communications. This condition is very restrictive. However, there are
some interesting points:
– Lemma 1 tells us that I2(1) = 0, hence the value of PY (0|σ = 1) has no
impact when c = 2. The marking assumption fixes the remaining term
PY (0|σ = 0) = 1 − PY (0|σ = c) = 1. Therefore, for a given function g1,
any collusion process involving only 2 colluders yields the same expectation
E(
∑2
k=1 U(Y,Xjk , P )).
– When the collusion belongs to the blind class, the size of the collusion doesn’t
matter: C(p) = Cs(p) = 2p(1− p), ∀c ∈ N.
For these two conditions, the above maximization shows that g1(p) = λ(1− p).
Table 5.2 shows the values of the expectation times the length of the code m =
100, for some functions C (column) against some functions g1 optimal for a given
collusion process (line). The last line corresponds to Tardos’ choice. The scores
on this line are all equal reflecting the independence versus the collusion process.
The first line corresponds to the choice g1(p) = λ(1−p). It is extremely important
to notice that expectations have been measured with f(p) = (π
√
p(1− p))−1.
In other words, there is still a degree of freedom to improve these scores. Or, we
can say that the assumptions yielding the function C have an impact on g1 but
not f , such that they are needed on the decoding side but not on the coding
side while generating matrix X.
The scores on the diagonal are always the best score of a column as they
correspond to matched accusation function and collusion process. However these
functions g1 are very sensitive with respect to the collusion: for instance, function
g1 tuned to fight against minority vote has excellent expectations when matched,
but very bad scores when the collusion process is indeed a majority vote. The
worst case attack led by omniscient colluders always has a dramatic effect. This
stresses the fact that {pi}mi=1 must absolutely remain secret.
6 Conclusion
The key idea supporting the probabilistic fingerprinting code proposed by G.
Tardos is to render the statistics of the scores of the innocents and of the col-
luders independent from the collusion process. Achieving the independence for
the first (expectation) and the second (variance) moments freezes all the degrees
of freedom, determining the functions involved in the code. Tardos’ choice is
the most general. There is no room for improvements, except if the maximum
collusion size is known when generating the code or if the collusion process is
known at the decoding side.
C
class blind sighted crypto omniscient
process Majority Minority All-1 All-0 Worst
size ∀c 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 3 4 5 2 3 4 5
g1
blind 71 80 80 83 53 44 33 66 62 58 66 62 58 41 9 -19 -44
Maj-3 67 84 84 92 34 17 -5 59 50 43 59 50 43 44 9 -23 -51
Maj-4 67 84 84 92 34 17 -5 59 50 43 59 50 43 44 9 -23 -51
Maj-5 63 83 83 93 24 4 -23 53 43 35 53 43 35 45 9 -25 -54
Min-3 50 38 38 29 75 87 105 56 62 67 56 62 67 16 5 -2 -10
Min-4 43 27 27 18 74 89 111 51 58 65 43 58 65 11 3 0 -3
Min-5 40 24 24 15 73 89 112 48 57 63 48 57 63 9 2 0 -2
All1-3 69 73 73 73 62 59 55 68 66 64 68 66 64 36 8 -16 -37
All1-4 65 63 63 60 70 72 76 66 67 68 66 67 68 30 7 -12 -28
All1-5 59 53 53 47 73 80 90 63 66 69 63 66 69 25 6 -8 -21
All0-3 69 73 73 73 62 59 55 68 66 64 68 66 64 36 8 -16 -37
All0-4 65 63 63 60 70 72 76 66 67 68 66 67 68 30 7 -12 -28
All0-5 59 53 53 47 73 80 90 63 66 69 63 66 69 25 6 -8 -21
Tardos 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 64 32 7 -14 -32
Table 2. Expectations of the sum of the scores of the colluders for a given collusion
process C, a given size c and a matched accusation function g1. m = 100. Expectations
are in boldface font when the accusation function matches the collusion process.
A Proof of Lemmas
A.1 Lemma 2
We show that the family of polynomials {Pc,σ}c−1σ=1 spans the subspace P of
polynomials of degree equal or less than (c− 1) whose integral over [0, 1] is null.
deg(Pc,σ) = c − 1 because Pc,σ(p) = pσ−1(1 − p)c−σ−1(cp − σ) = −σpσ−1 +
. . .+ (−1)c−σ−1pc−1. Besides: ∫ 1
0
Pc,σ(p)dp = c
σ!(c−σ−1)!
c! − σ (σ−1)!(c−σ−1)!(c−1)! = 0.
Denote N(p) =
∑c−1
σ=1 ασPc,σ(p) =
∑c−1
ℓ=0 βℓp
ℓ the null polynomial: N(p) =
0, ∀0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The term in p0 comes from the contribution of α1Pc,1(p).
Hence β0 = 0 implies α1 = 0. The term in p
1 comes from the contribution of
α1Pc,1(p)+α2Pc,2(p). Hence, β1 = 0 implies α2 = 0 since α1 = 0, etc. Therefore,∑c−1
σ=1 ασPc,σ = 0 implies (α1, . . . , αc−1) = 0. This proves that the polynomials
{Pc,σ}c−1σ=1 are linearly independent.
A.2 Lemma 3
We show that βl =
∫ 1
−1
PL2l(x)(1− x2)−1/2dx = π2−4l(2ll )2, and 0 < βl+1 < βl.
Even degree Legendre polynomials have the following generic expression:
PL2l(x) = 2
−2l
l∑
k=0
(−1)l−k (2l + 2k)!
(l − k)!(l + k)!(2k)!x
2k . (26)
Besides: ∫ 1
−1
x2k√
1− x2 dx =
π
k!
1.3.5 . . . (2k − 1)
2k
. (27)
Hence,
βl =
(−1)lπ
22l
l∑
k=0
ck,l with ck,l = (−1)k (2l + 2k)!
(l + k)!(l − k)!k!k!22k . (28)
Note that c0,l = (
2l
l ), and ck+1,l/ck,l = (k− l)(k+ l+1/2)/(k+1)2. This means
that βl can be expressed thanks to an hypergeometric function of the second
kind:
βl =
(−1)lπ
22l
(2ll ) 2F1(−l, l + 1/2; 1; 1) . (29)
It turns out that 2F1(−l, l+1/2; 1; 1) = (1/2− l)l/l!, where (k)l is a Pochammer
coefficient. Some more lines of calculus give (1/2− l)l = (−1)l2−2l(2l)!/l!. This
produces the expected result. Secondly,
βl+1
βl
=
(
l + 1/2
l + 1
)2
< 1 . (30)
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